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14. ABSTRACT  Historically, the majority of U.S. conflicts have been Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Many of which have been successful, too often though, the United States has fallen short of its objects and failed at conflict termination in MOOTW. Why does a nation capable of conducting and successfully terminating an unlimited war such as, World War II, have such inconsistent results with MOOTW that are limited in nature?  Warfare has changed significantly in our lifetime, as has the role that the military plays on the global stage. Challenges have become more complex, conflicts are more internal to national borders, and tactics more asymmetric. During the Cold War, America focused its military efforts on the Soviet Union, a known enemy, who after 40 years of confrontation became somewhat a matter of routine. This limited our intelligence interests toward other small states and non-state actors. The result was a stunted development of doctrine and training that did not prepare America for the untraditional challenges of today.  Today's conflicts will not be won through attrition (the destruction of forces and resources on both sides), but through a combination of technology, power projection and intelligence. The military does not want to make enemies, but when it does, they must be dealt with quickly and decisively, while maintaining a posture that supports war termination and post conflict operations.  To meet today's challenges and to prepare for both unlimited war and MOOTW, cultural intelligence must be integrated into the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB) phase of the Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES).					
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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
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**Cultural Intelligence, Meeting Today's Demands**

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**A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction  
of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily  
endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

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**17 May 2004**

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## **Abstract**

Historically, the majority of U.S. conflicts have been Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Many of which have been successful, too often though the United States has fallen short of its objects and failed at conflict termination in MOOTW. Why does a nation capable of conducting and successfully terminating an unlimited war such as, World War II, have such inconsistent results with MOOTW that are limited in nature?

Warfare has changed significantly in our lifetime, as has the role that the military plays on the global stage. Challenges have become more complex, conflicts are more internal to national borders, and tactics more asymmetric. During the Cold War, America focused its military efforts on the Soviet Union, a known enemy, who after 40 years of confrontation became somewhat a matter of routine. This limited our intelligence interests toward other small states and non-state actors. The result was a stunted development of doctrine and training that did not prepare America for the untraditional challenges of today.

Today's conflicts will not be won through attrition (the destruction of forces and resources on both sides), but through a combination of technology, power projection and intelligence. The military does not want to make enemies, but when it does, they must be dealt with quickly and decisively, while maintaining a posture that supports war termination and post conflict operations.

To meet today's challenges and to prepare for both unlimited war and MOOTW, cultural intelligence must be integrated into the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB) phase of the Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES).

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## INTRODUCTION

The termination of the Korean War was the first sign that the United States is not as effective at bringing an end to limited conflicts and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) as it was at ending World War II, an unlimited war. The Vietnam experience further highlighted this fact, and the trend continues today. With such successful examples of MOOTW as “Black Jack” Pershing’s operation on the island of Mindanao in 1901, why is it that today the world’s only superpower too frequently fails at operations where the focus is on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace and supporting civil authorities, rather than unlimited war where the goal is total defeat of an adversary?<sup>1</sup> To answer this question, we must understand the changes in the military’s roles and missions, as well as the global environment.

When the Pentagon talks about the “transformation” of the military services, the emphasis is placed on becoming faster, lighter, more precise and more lethal. This, of course, is of tremendous importance “But given what is going on in the world today, transformation should focus on better preparing and training U.S. forces for peacekeeping and nation-building duties”.<sup>2</sup> MOOTW requires that the conflict phase of operations set the stage for transition to post-conflict and stability operations in order to accomplish objectives with minimal cost. Of critical importance in accomplishing this is an understanding of cultural intelligence and incorporating it into the Commander’s Estimate of the Situation (CES) process.

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<sup>1</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Joint Pub 3-07 (Washington, DC: 16 June 1995), I-1

<sup>2</sup> Erwin, Sandra I., Transformation: are the Goals Off Target? November 2003.  
<<http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/article.cfm?Id=1234>>

Cultural intelligence must be effectively integrated into the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB) process in preparation for both war and MOOTW because of the impact it has on the adversary's will to resist, and other critical factors such as popular support, human intelligence, legitimacy, position of third party nations, and conflict termination. To prove this assertion, we will first discuss the current status of cultural intelligence by looking at its definition and showing historical examples that illustrate how a disregard for cultural intelligence contributed to operational failure. This information will then be analyzed in terms of its significance for future doctrine development and training. Finally, the author will examine recommended solutions and conclusions in regards to the application of cultural intelligence during the JIPB process and the execution of operations. This will demonstrate how doctrine, training, and an International Affairs Officer (IAO) program can have a positive impact on the JIPB process.

### **Background**

As early as 1971, Lieutenant Colonel Albert Sidney Britt III, Department of History, United States Military Academy, noted that, “The modern philosophy of limited war derives in part from the practice of the 18<sup>th</sup> century.”<sup>3</sup> His reference was the study of the Napoleonic Wars and the impact on today’s military philosophy. Clausewitz explains,

The terms ‘art of war’ or ‘science of war’ were focused only on the total body of knowledge and skill that was concerned with material factors...It did not yet include the use of force...subject to constant interaction with an adversary, nor the efforts of spirit and courage to achieve a desired end.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Dell Publishing, 1984), 23-24

<sup>4</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 133

Simply stated, our military philosophy, to a degree, is based on force alone with little, if any, consideration given to the impact of cultural intelligence on military operations. In today's environment, military interactions go beyond that required with the enemy's political and military leaders, but include to no lesser degree, interaction with the inhabitants of the country involved, as well as, coalition members and third party governments.

During the Cold War, Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, Deputy Chief of Staff for Army Intelligence, recognized the narrowness of vision within the military when he said, "We looked at the Soviet Union as the enemy and we built our forces around that specific target set. And the problem with that symmetric approach is it also biased how we do intelligence."<sup>5</sup> We knew our enemy and how he fought; there was no need for cultural intelligence or consideration for its likely impact on operations and objectives. This bias not only restricted the scope of intelligence requirements, but also virtually eliminated all interest in cultural intelligence and its impact on operational objectives.

In a recent exposition of the shortcomings of current defense planning, the noted foreign correspondent and author of numerous books on foreign relations and political figures, Georgie Anne Geyer, opined "that the most crucial element is still being left out of our military and foreign policy planning. This is cultural knowledge."<sup>6</sup> With the global interest and scrutiny fed by improved communications and the media, today's military forces must use, and be effective with, every tool available to them, including cultural intelligence.

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<sup>5</sup> Megan Scully, "Social Intel New Tool For U.S. Military," Defense News, (April 26, 2004): 21 <[www.ofi.osd.mil/library/library\\_files/article\\_362\\_Defense%20News.doc](http://www.ofi.osd.mil/library/library_files/article_362_Defense%20News.doc)>

<sup>6</sup> Cultural Intelligence Seminar 22 May 97, Summary Report

## **What is Cultural Intelligence**

The American Heritage Dictionary defines culture as, “The totality of socially transmitted behavior patterns, art, beliefs, institutions, and all other products of human work and thought characteristic of a community or population.”<sup>7</sup> The definition indicates, to a degree, that culture can contribute to the planning and execution of military operations, however when combined with the definition of cultural relativity the importance becomes even more predominate.

Cultural Relativism: Different cultural groups think, feel, and act differently...Studying differences in culture among groups and societies presupposes a position of cultural relativism...It calls for judgment when dealing with groups or societies different from one's own. Information about the nature of cultural differences between societies, their roots, and their consequences should precede judgment and action. Negotiation is more likely to succeed when the parties concerned understand the reasons for the differences in viewpoints.<sup>8</sup>

This brings into focus the importance of cultural intelligence in functions from developing and maintaining coalitions, planning and executing all phases of military operations and the missions of nation building and stability operations.

Cultural Intelligence is the understanding of people on their own terms, understanding how things really work in areas of potential military operations, and analyzing this information and the impact it has on MOOTW from the diverse cultural perspectives of other nations.<sup>9</sup> It is viewing the world through the eyes, and from the perception, of those who we are studying. This knowledge will significantly reduce the tendency to “mirror image” and/or “script write” during operational planning and wargaming.

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<sup>7</sup> The American Heritage Dictionary Of The English Language, New College Edition

<sup>8</sup> Culture, <<http://www.tamu.edu/classes/cosc/choudhury/culture.html>>

## The Impacts of Ignoring Cultural Intelligence

As has been the case for over 225 years, today's military forces must be prepared to fight in any corner of the world. In many of these conflicts, particularly those classified as "small wars," such as Pershing's 1901 operation against the Islamic Moros on Mindanao, the key factor in determining who will win may depend on a thorough knowledge of the local culture, as well as the military and political leadership. This is of particular concern in conflict termination and stability operations.

"Military or theater-strategic objectives encompass not only military considerations, but also political, diplomatic, economic, social, environmental, informational, and often ethnic, religious aspects."<sup>10</sup> A Combatant Commander (COCOM) has access to the most sophisticated and technologically advanced weapons in the world; however, their inability to anticipate human reactions to a selected Course of Action (COA) often interferes with success.

An example of underestimating an opponent's reaction to military operations, due to a lack of cultural intelligence, was the Japanese failure to understand what impact the bombing of Pearl Harbor would have on the American public. Japan saw Hawaii as merely a United States territory and believed that, "America may be enraged for a while, but later will come to understand."<sup>11</sup> The result of this miscalculation was that the American people were bonded by an intense hatred for the Japanese people that mobilized a national war effort unlike the world had ever seen, that led to Japan's total defeat.

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<sup>9</sup> Cultural Intelligence Seminar 22 May 97, Summary Report.  
<http://www.wargaming.quantico.usmc.mil/Programs/JCIS.cfm>

<sup>10</sup> Milan Vego, Operational Warfare (NWC 1004: 2000), 378

<sup>11</sup> R.A.C. Parker, Struggle for Survival, The History of the Second World War, (Oxford University Press 1989), 83

Americans have always had a tendency to project their beliefs and values on those of other countries. In the Vietnam War, the United States failed to recognize that Vietnam had been fighting for nationalism for 2000 years. America attempted to install two leaders in South Vietnam and never acknowledged the Vietnamese belief in “*Trung*”, that loyalty to the emperor was only merited if the emperor was a Vietnamese patriot first. “If the emperor bowed to foreign will then loyalty was not obligatory.”<sup>12</sup> This failure in cultural intelligence caused many South Vietnamese to take up arms against the United States. Further, U.S. servicemen were sent to Vietnam with little or no knowledge of the people or their culture. The author’s personal experience was that troops were taught that the Vietnamese were crude, dangerous, undisciplined “Gooks”<sup>13</sup> that could not stand up to U.S. military strength. In reality, the Vietnamese were a tenacious, dedicated force that constituted a formidable adversary. The lack of cultural knowledge caused U.S. servicemen to deface valued ancestral artifacts and conduct themselves in a manner that caused a large number of the non-combatant population to side with North Vietnam. The U.S. never realized that, a culture immersed in centuries-old struggles against foreign rule made recruitment much easier for the North Vietnamese leadership. Throughout most of Vietnam the feeling was, “We must fight for our country....We must fight the Americans... because their presence is destroying our native land...culturally and morally.”<sup>14</sup>

The Wars in Iraq have produced a number of lessons learned; one being that close examination of the enemy’s will (requiring familiarity with his language, culture and politics)

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<sup>12</sup> Robert E. Vadas, Cultures in Conflict The Viet Nam War (Greenwood Press 2002), 72

<sup>13</sup> Gooks was a derogatory, slang term used by Americans when referring to the Vietnamese people.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, 61

is a requirement.<sup>15</sup> During the first Gulf War, both sides made serious miscalculations regarding cultural intelligence. However, on the positive side, General Schwarzkopf studied Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi military very careful.<sup>16</sup> The time spent and knowledge gained enabled General Schwarzkopf to anticipate most every move made by Saddam Hussein and his forces. This contributed significantly to planning and executing combat operations, but had little impact on conflict termination or follow-on operations.

The United States is the single world superpower, which makes us a threat to every other nation state on the globe. The un-empowered populations of the world can, and do, represent a serious threat to global security and U.S. national interests. Ignoring this could be a mistake of huge proportions even though the group poses no discernable impact to U.S. national security. Those groups who are emerging as threats today may possess a passionate desire to win at all costs and an unrestricted desire to employ asymmetric warfare. Every available tool must be used to combat this threat.

### **The Problem**

Although the impact of cultural intelligence on the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war is not a new revolution in military reform, it is an issue that remains at the bottom of the list of priorities. Too often, training in culture is nothing more than a focus on language, folklore, food, art, economics, weather and geography. The people, their values, their religion, their ancestry, and their beliefs are overlooked. We must take great care not to project our views onto those who we study and interact with. Understanding and respect for other cultures are essential to success in MOOTW. Culture determines what is admired and

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<sup>15</sup> Michael I. Handel, Masters of War 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (Oregon: Frank Cass 2001) 15

<sup>16</sup> Frontline, “Oral History: Norman Schwarzkopf January 1996  
<<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/>>

what is despised, what makes life worth living, and what is worth dying for. This knowledge is even more important when dealing with people under conditions of stress who fear that they are fighting for their survival, regardless of how we as Americans view the situation.

Learning about culture is complicated by the fact that there are many different cultures and many different factors that contribute to cultural development and values. Moreover, the areas of culture that are of greatest significance in military operations -- questions of loyalty, honor, and obligation, for example -- are areas in which there is no substitute for accurate and very specific knowledge.<sup>17</sup> Understanding culture, interpreting how actions will impact the mindset of its people, and anticipating their reactions is an art, not a science. It has nothing tangible by which to gauge and, therefore, is not a curriculum that interests most military personnel. Thus, cultural intelligence competes against technology while its benefits such as its potential to shorten military operations and save lives are ignored.

There is little emphasis on the subject of cultural intelligence at any level. This appears to be a subject that requires a paradigm shift before advancements will be made. For example, Joint Doctrine identifies a requirement for cultural awareness and intelligence; however, there is no direction given for its application, applicability or integration into the joint planning process. This lack of interest is demonstrated in the fact that, to date, the United States has yet to conduct ... operations utilizing a full range of capabilities – public affairs, civil affairs, psychological operations.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Marine Corps Warfighting Lab Wargaming Division, "Cultural Intelligence Seminar Series," <[www.wargaming.quantico.usmc.mil/programs/jcis.cfm](http://www.wargaming.quantico.usmc.mil/programs/jcis.cfm)>

<sup>18</sup> Synthia S. Jones, Bernard Flowers, and Karlton D Johnson, "Unity of Effort in Joint Information Operations" Joint Forces Quarterly (Winter 02,03), 78

The International Affairs Officer Program (IAO) was established to meet the requirements for cultural awareness and intelligence. Yet this program fails to meet the needs of the COCOM as evidenced by a 2003 study, which pointed out the following deficiencies: lack of trained IAO personnel; IAOs not viewed as warfighters; limited IAO career mobility; and the fact that many planning staffs do not understand the difference between an IAO and an intelligence officer. Further, the service programs are not designed to support the mission, provide consistency, or make maximum use of trained personnel. The current IAO rotation program is open to active duty military officers only. It consists of 30 to 39 months of training, followed by 36 months of duty in their primary occupational specialty, where their newly acquired IAO skills are not used, then a follow-on 36 month IAO tour. There is no database to track trained IAOs and many are lost track of. Further, there is no DOD wide system to integrate IAO assets to meet DOD wide billet requirements.<sup>19</sup> This highlights the lack of understanding within the services of the capabilities of the IAO mission and the role of cultural intelligence in the CES process.

### **The Military's Expanding Mission**

The military is playing a much larger role in the diplomatic mission of America. Today, DoD civilians and the uniformed military increasingly serve the functions that State officials once did. Regardless of the reasons or the rational behind it, “the military...came to surpass its civilian leaders in resources and influence around the world. The changing nature of geopolitics also favored DoD over the State Department.”<sup>20</sup> After the collapse of the Soviet Union, civil wars, terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and other low-intensity forms of

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<sup>19</sup> Science Applications International Corporation, Foreign Area Officer Programs: Changing DOD’s Culture Defense Language Transformation Task 2 (Washington DC: 2004), 34-36

<sup>20</sup> Joshua Kurlantzick, “Expanding Mission,” Military Officer, 5 (May 2004): 54

conflict predominated. Civilian leadership began to rely more on the military than it had during the cold war. As Lt.Gen. Anthony Zinni said, “No longer does the military just do the killing and breaking. It has to be engaged day in and day out, building alliances and coalitions, training others, and supporting stability.”<sup>21</sup> This makes the need for cultural intelligence even more important. During the CES process, planners have an increasing requirement to know and understand the impact that operations and individual actions will have on the population, particularly in the non-traditional conflicts and post-conflict phases of operations today.

The missions of the military today are changing rapidly and require training in areas that were not previously considered. Lt.Gen. Zinni, describes the situation as follows,

The missions today are certainly non-traditional, I have trained and established police forces, judiciary committees; resettled refugees; negotiated with warlords, tribal leaders, and clan elders; and distributed food and provided medical assistance. Nowhere in my military career did anybody prepare me for this...these are the kinds of non-traditional tasks we have to do better and will be required to accomplish in the future.<sup>22</sup>

Today’s conflicts will not be won through attrition warfare. They require knowledge, skill, flexibility, foresight and planning. They will be won through intelligence, and human intelligence will continue to be the most valuable form of intelligence, as has been demonstrated throughout history.

## **Analysis**

Training forces to understand the culture of the people they will be in contact with is critical to the operational commander, particularly in MOOTW. “In major warfare, hatred of

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<sup>21</sup> Erwin

<sup>22</sup> The relevance of Cultural Awareness to the Marine Corps  
<http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/search/papers/lindberg.htm.>

the enemy is developed among troops to arouse courage. In small wars, tolerance, sympathy, and kindness should be the keynote of our relationship with the mass of the population.”<sup>23</sup>

Studying the culture can provide an insight into what is important to the people and how they will interpret and respond to our actions. We must never forget that, regardless of the reason for our presence, the fact that we are there has an impact on the lives of the people,. This is all too frequently viewed as an imposition of American will and a disregard for local beliefs, values, and customs. This perception contributes to the support and legitimacy of our opponent. It increases the strength of the enemy force by alienating non-combatant neutrals and causing them to side with the opposition.

The limited training in cultural intelligence, historically, was kept at the higher levels and used primarily for negotiations and coalition building. However, it is becoming more obvious that training at all levels is critically important. Operations today function under centralized planning and decentralized execution. The inescapable lesson of Somalia and other recent operations, whether humanitarian assistance, peace-keeping, or traditional warfighting, is that the outcome may hinge on decisions made by small unit leaders and by actions taken at the lowest level.<sup>24</sup> The initial forces on the ground are tasked with tremendous responsibility that can have operational and strategic significance. Their initial actions and interaction with non-combatants will have the largest impact on public opinion and support. Not only must the young troops keep themselves and their comrades alive, they must also conduct themselves in a firm and professional manner. If troops are not taught basic cultural points, their actions can set the stage for protracted problems generated by

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<sup>23</sup> United States Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual United States Marine Corps 1940. (Washington, DC: 1940). 32

increased enemy support by inhabitants who turned to the enemy as a result of actions that were culturally unacceptable.

Cultural training prior to deployment will produce professional attitudes and proper military conduct that will demonstrate to the population that we are not the evil foreigner who came to steal their valuables, abuse their women, and inflict pain and suffering at will, as the enemy propaganda has taught. Further, an understanding of the culture and the requirement to protect the people will make great strides in gaining the confidence and support of the population and significantly enhance mission accomplishment and post conflict operations.

Gaining the populations confidence will reduce popular support of our adversary, and reduce their legitimacy, not only in the eyes of the country in question, but also in the eyes of the rest of the world. Finally, putting cultural intelligence to use will reduce the possibility of neighboring or sympathizing states from intervening in the conflict and escalating hostilities. Clearly, the actions of a troop on the street in Somalia, Haiti, Iraq, or any other location can affect the operational and strategic levels of war at the speed of a media broadcast signal.

Due to the military strength of the United States and our allies, it is evident that an attack by conventional means would not be successful. However, as proven by the 9-11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the United States is not immune to attacks with devastating results. In this arena, cultural intelligence can have a significant impact on the results of the operations undertaken against the United States. In the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), cultural intelligence can contribute to understanding the mindset of the people who support terrorism and those who carry out terrorist operations. This

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<sup>24</sup> General Charles C. Krulak, The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War <<http://www.usmc.mil/cmcarticles.nsf/f9c9e7a1fe55fe42852564280078b406/2d97090f3fe41>>

information can help strengthen ties with existing allies, develop new alliances, and assist in anticipating actions of adversaries. Most importantly, however, the increase of human intelligence and cooperation between nations can contribute to achieving our objectives and restricting terrorist operations. If U.S./coalition forces can win the hearts and minds of the inhabitants of troubled regions, the intelligence benefits will be significant.

Aside from the intelligence benefits, cultural intelligence will provide the COCOM with the potential to control the number of forces -- both military and civilian -- who are in opposition to our actions by encouraging cooperation and reducing local support to our adversary. This could impact the number of forces required on the ground and potentially reduce the length of military operations needed to achieve the end state.

The impact of the cultural aspect of conflict is not limited to the people of the country that we occupy. Every military operation will have an impact on nations that are sympathetic to the causes of the nation in which we are operating. Recognizing this and wargaming anticipated reactions to military options are essential to conflict termination and reducing third party interference.

The importance of the interplay between the United States, coalition partners and third party states goes without saying. A classic example is the interplay between Saudi Arabia and the United States during Gulf War I. As General Schwarzkopf put it, “It was absolutely necessary to have the Saudis’ permission to come in because of the sovereignty of the nation of Saudi Arabia and the number of forces we were going to bring into the country...”<sup>25</sup> Every coalition member will have a different view of how to approach a particular situation. This view may be based on ulterior motives, capabilities, or concerns of retaliation for economic or territorial reasons. Regardless of the reason, an in-depth

knowledge of the culture and how people view given situations can keep coalitions stable and reduce seams through proactive initiatives designed to de-conflict issues that, if ignored, could lead to chaos.

Americans have great confidence and pride in their nation, an honorable characteristic, but one that is often seen as being arrogant and disrespectful by the people of occupied nations. To mitigate these perceptions and the effects of disregarding cultural intelligence, some have suggested an increase in the use of Military Police (MP). The implication being that combat forces can not interact with non-combatants or perform MP functions, due to their mission and training. Lessons learned from Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Panama and numerous other locations are replete with findings of combat forces successfully interacting with non-combatants, and performing MP functions in an exemplary manner, with minimal training. The suggested use of MPs does not account for the concerns with having forces that have trained together and will provide the best possible force to repel an unknown threat. MPs normally do not train with combat units and, therefore, may not be considered as effective as infantry assets in a heightened combat environment. Commanders of units in Operation Iraqi Freedom I were concerned with the effectiveness of MP due to a lack of training and subsequent bonding between MP units and combat forces.<sup>26</sup> Commanders are also concerned with available space to transport forces and equipment into theater during the initial deployment phase of the operation. Their focus, at this time, is getting the strongest and best equipped forces possible into theater to accomplish the mission. Additionally, the stateside, or garrison role, of the MP does not go away during conflict times of armed conflict; therefore, the numbers of MP to fulfill the additional mission requirements

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<sup>25</sup> Frontline

are not available. While working on MP structure at Headquarter Marine Corps in 1996, the author discovered that the Marine Corps had just over 3000 military police on the authorized Table of Organization (T/O). This figure was almost 50 percent less than the 1985 authorized military police structure. Current military police manning levels will not support these requirements and will require an increase in structure.

Every action taken by the COCOM and his forces will have a significant effect on the American public. Popular support for military operations is critical to our political and military leadership, and the moral of our forces. Again, cultural intelligence across the entire spectrum of war plays a significant role in our ability to effectively engage an adversary and then execute our exit strategy. Referring once again to the Vietnam conflict, the lack of emphasis on cultural intelligence resulted in a protracted conflict and almost irreparable damage to the United States, both at home and abroad.

As time progresses, the requirements placed on the military will continue to increase. Our position as a world Superpower carries a huge responsibility that will require a new way of approaching the business of armed conflict. Our focus is on conflict resolution with minimal casualties and environmental destruction. Military operations, since the end of the Cold War, have increased and the trend is not likely to change. It's time to add cultural intelligence to our arsenal of non-lethal options. As Professor Adda Boszeman explains,

People in the developing regions of the world view war and conflict differently than North Americans and North Europeans. Further, nation-state driven causes of conflict, so prominent in the West, are less important in the third world than cultural, psychological and ethnic-racial causes.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> LtCol John D. Troutman <[troutmanjd@hqmc.usmc.mil](mailto:troutmanjd@hqmc.usmc.mil)> “MP BN Concept VTC Back Brief” [E-mail to Col. D.J. Anderson <[donald.anderson@nwc.navy.mil](mailto:donald.anderson@nwc.navy.mil)> 12 May 2004]

<sup>27</sup> Steven J. Blank and others, Conflict, Culture, and History Regional Dimensions (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama,: Air University Press, 1993), 117

An understanding of foreign attitudes and values can reduce anxiety and aggression, thereby reducing misinterpretations and over reactions.

One of the lessons learned from Operation Restore Hope was that the lack of knowledge about the culture in Somalia inhibited the decisions and actions of Marines in daily interaction with locals.<sup>28</sup> This alienated our forces and turned the population against coalition forces, contributing to the failure to attain political and military objectives.

Senior leaders and planners in Operations Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom cite a lack of qualified linguists and regional area experts as a major shortcoming in both operational planning and execution.<sup>29</sup> Lieutenant General Wallace C. Gregson, Commander III MEF, requested permanent assignments of IAOs to his planning teams in the G-5, with the expertise to cover every region within his Area of Responsibility (AOR) from the Pacific Rim to Central Asia. Because there were no such requirements on the MEF T/O, the initiative gained little support.<sup>30</sup>

Threats today are different. They're non-traditional; they're ones we haven't experienced before. "The application of the military isn't as direct as we would like, and our theory and doctrine prevent dealing with reality, which is overlaid and mixed with politics and economics, as well as humanitarian and cultural issues."<sup>31</sup> The indirect approach is becoming more important, and to make it effective a cultural base of knowledge is essential.

## **Recommendations**

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<sup>28</sup> Lack of Cultural Understanding, Operation Restore Hope, Marine Corps Lessons Learned

<sup>29</sup> Science Applications International Corporation, 34

<sup>30</sup> LtCol John F. May <[mayjf@hqmc.usmc.mil](mailto:mayjf@hqmc.usmc.mil)> "RE: Information Request" [E-mail to Col. D.J. Anderson <[donald.anderson@nwc.navy.mil](mailto:donald.anderson@nwc.navy.mil)> 6 May 2004]

<sup>31</sup> Harry Kreister, The Military's Role in a Changing World, Conversation with Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, 6 March 2001. <<http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/Zinni/zinni-con4.html>>

To insure that cultural intelligence becomes an effective tool for the COCOMs, doctrine must be developed to establish training, and procedures for the collection and analysis of cultural intelligence, and its integration into the JIPB phase of the CES process. Procedures should integrate the IAO functions with other planners on the COCOM's operational staff to analyze intelligence/information, to predict affects of operations on both the non-combatant population and the enemy forces, and anticipated responses. In the "Mission Analysis" phase, the IAO would clarify any questions the commander may have and identify circumstances that could impact previous analysis. "In the Development of COAs" phase, the IAO would predict the cultural impact of the COAs and short/long term affects, and recommend actions to mitigate negative cultural affects. In the "Comparison of COAs" phase, the IAO would outline which course of action would be most likely to maintain popular support while accomplishing the objectives in a timely manner. Finally, to capitalize on cultural knowledge gained in the process and off set enemy propaganda as early as possible, implement procedures to ensure for the effective use of media, civil affairs, and Psychological Operations (PsyOps).

To support this initiative, the DOD should establish an IAO Executive Agent (EA) to identify current and developing requirements for the services IAO programs. DOD should also establish critical billet positions on all COCOM staffs, embassies, attachés, and headquarters staff, and develop a structure across the services to support the requirements.

To develop the structure, open the program to civilians in order to lend longevity and stability to the program. Officers in the IAO program should remain in the program in their specific regional area of expertise with rotations between the country and the COCOM's Headquarters. Each COCOM should have a permanent IAO cadre on the operational staff to

cover every region within the AOR. This cadre would have the capability to provide instantaneous briefs to the COCOM regarding the regional culture and the potential impact of events and operations on the population. Additionally, the IAO's would assist the J-3 in developing and maintaining training syllabi for each region that is tailored to meet requirements for each echelon of the command.

Develop criteria for the training and education of all forces in the basics of the culture, values, and beliefs of the country in which they are entering. This should include religion, values, and ancestral beliefs, as well as training in the fundamentals of the language.

Cultural intelligence training should be incorporated into the mid, career, and top level military officer schools. This training should include analytical principles of applying culture to operational planning and the CES process. Additionally, because of the decentralized execution of today's operations, the appropriate level of cultural intelligence, indoctrination and training should be included in the Non-Commissioned, Staff Non-Commissioned and Advanced Enlisted military education courses.

Develop a "Profiling Cell" within each COCOM Headquarters, similar to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Criminal Profiling Center. This cell would focus on the personality and character traits of political and military leaders within their AOR. The information obtained would prove invaluable in planning operations and in the art of anticipating enemy reactions to operations, planning countermeasures and carrying on negotiations.

## **CONCLUSION**

This paper does not suggest that cultural intelligence can replace or overshadow the need for technology and the ability to project combat power. It simply points out that the

integration of cultural intelligence at all levels of command, including the small unit leaders, will enhance our ability to achieve the objective in the quickest and least costly manner. The goal of cultural intelligence is to gain popular support while minimizing the opposition's ability to resist U.S. initiatives. An understanding of culture will enable the COCOM to develop and execute an initial strategy that will support follow-on operations with minimal resistance.

The recommendations proposed are mutually supporting and build toward over all mission accomplishment. To respond to the environment one must understand the people, their culture, and their beliefs. It is time to establish doctrine, training and processes to meet new challenges. Today, and into the future, we will engage in joint and multi-national operations. The key to success will lie in the COCOM's CES process and its use of knowledge, intelligence, planning, training and technology.

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